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1 Introduction
Industrial clusters are popular among policy makers. Since the end of the 1980s, national and
local governments in Germany, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, the Spanish Basque country, and
France, inter alia, have attempted to foster their development. The work by Michael Porter
(1998, 2000), the leading figure of cluster strategies, has been very influential in this matter
and is invariably used as a justification for cluster policies. There is however little macro or
micro empirical analysis of their effect on firms performance. The present paper attempts to
fill this gap by analyzing the effect, on individual firms, of a specific cluster policy in France.
A typical defense of cluster policies is that clusters bring economic gains and should
therefore receive public support. Porter’s definition of a cluster – “a geographically proximate
group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked
by commonalities and complementarities” – is not very far from what economists call an
agglomeration. The idea that clusters bring economic gains because firms perform better when
located near other firms in the same sector is hardly new. In the late nineteenth century, Alfred
Marshall identified several benefits of clusters or industrial districts. The different sources of
agglomeration externalities, were first analyzed by Marshall and later rediscovered by Kenneth
Arrow and Paul Romer. Those are 1) input externalities that save on transportation costs
and make inputs purchases more efficient; 2) Labour market externalities that foster the
creation of pools of specialized workers, who acquire cluster-specific skills valuable to the
firms; 3) Knowledge externalities through which industrial clusters facilitate the exchange of
information and knowledge.
Advocates of cluster policies need to address three questions:
1. How large are the gains from agglomeration? In particular, how much does the pro-
ductivity of a firm increase when other firms from the same sector decide to locate
nearby?
2. Do firms internalize these gains when making their location decisions? In particular,
are “natural” clusters too small?
3. Can public policies that attempt to foster clusters affect positively the performance of
the firms that belong to those clusters?
There is a large empirical literature that has attempted to answer the first question.
The survey of Rosenthal and Strange (2004) reports that in the many empirical studies on
agglomeration, the doubling of the size a cluster (generally measured as employment of a given
sector in a given region) leads to a productivity gain between 3% and 8%. In another paper
on French firm-level data, (Martin, Mayer, and Mayneris (2008)), we estimate this elasticity
to be around 4%. The starting point of those who defend cluster strategies is thus right:
economic gains of clusters exist. Their enthusiasm should however be tamed; these effects are
modest. In the same paper, we also find evidence that French firms internalize part of these
productivity gains when they choose where to locate: the size of existing “natural” clusters
is not very different from the size that would maximize productivity gains1. The observed
size of clusters is slightly smaller than the one that would be optimal but the productivity
1The estimated positive elasticities in the literature, taken literally, would suggest that larger clusters are
always better. In fact, we find that productivity gains first increase then decrease (due to congestion costs)
with the size of clusters, allowing us to estimate an optimal size of the cluster.
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gains that would be obtained by increasing the size of existing clusters are estimated to be
small. Overall, the existing empirical work on clusters suggests that they produce economic
gains and that these gains are not fully internalized by firms. Hence, the case for public
intervention in favor of clusters can be made but there is no evidence that the expected gains
should be large.
Finally, even if one assumes that there is a case for public intervention (gains from clusters
exist and there are not entirely internalized by firms), there is little evidence on the answer
to the third question, on which the present paper focuses. Can cluster policies actually help?
They could do so in two main dimensions. First, cluster policies could increase the size of
existing clusters and thus improve the performance of firms if the cluster size is suboptimally
small. Second, cluster policies could improve the workings of externalities (input markets
externalities, labour markets externalities and technological externalities) inside clusters for a
given size of the cluster. Both mechanisms could increase productivity of firms in the cluster.
In this paper, we exploit a rich French firm-level dataset to analyze the impact of a
specific cluster policy that was implemented in 1999, by the De´le´gation Interministe´rielle a`
l’Ame´nagement et a` la Compe´titivite´ des Territoires (Diact, ex Datar), the French adminis-
tration in charge of spatial planning and regional policy. The policy provided support to a
group of firms, located in the same area and belonging to the same industry, called the “Local
Productive Systems” (LPS). The main aim of the policy was to encourage cooperation among
firms and to increase the competitiveness of firms in the cluster.
We assess the impact of public support to LPS on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP)
and on firms’ employment. We use a difference in difference approach exploiting this detailed
dataset that spans over the 1996 to 2004 period, during which a subsample of firms where
selected to benefit from the policy.
We first analyze the characteristics of firms that were chosen by the authorities. This
is interesting because it raises important political economy issues. Our results show clearly
that the French LPS policy targeted firms located in backward regions and operating in
declining industries. Hence, the policy turned out to be of a defensive type. The official
objective was to promote agglomeration externalities and clusters dynamics and was supposed
to mark a radical shift of the French regional policy, from traditional spatial equity to efficiency
considerations. Our results suggest that the traditional equity objective was in reality still
at play.2 We also find that LPS firms receive more public subsidies in general than others.
This is consistent with the study by Beason and Weinstein (1996) on Japan. They show that
the reality of industrial policies implemented between 1955 and 1990 clashed with the official
objective to help the growth of winners. Indeed, they find a negative correlation between the
growth of a given industry and the intensity of the aid it received. Our results on the French
cluster policy we study as well as those of Beason and Weinstein (1996) are consistent with
two interpretations. One is that subsidies to declining industries reveal government political
preferences (Corden (1974), Krueger (1990)). Another possible mechanism is provided by
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007). These authors show why governments often “pick losers”
or more exactly why public subsidies are captured by firms in decline which have a greater
incentive to lobby for subsidies.
We also find that the public support has been unable to reverse the relative decline of
TFP at work for firms selected by the policy. However, it may have had a slight positive
2An additional indication of that spatial equity objective is that the LPS projects are relatively evenly
spread out on the national territory.
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impact in terms of employment. Hence, it may have delayed the exit of declining firms, and
in this case such policies could have had a negative impact on aggregate productivity.
This is also what Criscuolo, Matin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2007) conclude in a study
that analyzes the impact of the Regional Selective Assistance in UK. They find that the
policy, designed to subsidize firms in backward areas, has had a positive impact on firms’
employment and investment but no effect on firms’ productivity. By supporting less efficient
firms, the authors judge that such a policy may slow down reallocations from less efficient
plants and affect negatively aggregate productivity growth.
A more positive conclusion is reached by Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) who ana-
lyze Japanese R&D public policy and its effect on the patenting activity of firms involved in
government-sponsored research consortia. They find a positive impact, though quite small
when all controls are included. Their method, which consists in examining the relative patent-
ing path of consortia firms the years after the inception of the consortium is close to ours.
A related literature has analyzed the effect of subsidies given to firms to locate in specific
regions. Crozet, Mayer, and Mucchielli (2004) study for example the determinants of location
choice by foreign investors in France over the period 1985-1995. They measure the impact of
a French subsidy (the “Prime d’Ame´nagement du Territoire”, PAT) and of European grants
for regional policy on firms’ location choice. They find a generally positive, but very weak
and hardly significant effect of those policies. Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) analyze the
effect of state level policies in United States to attract Japanese firms and find that the
probability to attract these firms increases with the subsidies. However, given that all states
have such policies, the location of firms is not affected in equilibrium. Finally, Devereux,
Griffith, and Simpson (2007) study the effect of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) grants3
on firms location in United Kingdom. They also find a positive but very weak effect of the
policy.
The paper is structured as follows. We first describe in section 2 the Local Productive
Systems policy and our data. We then lay out in section 2.5 our empirical strategy. We
present our results in section 3 and some robustness checks in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 What are the “Local Productive Systems”?
2.1 The policy
The French agency in charge of regional policy (DIACT) issued in 1998 a tender intended
to fund collaborative projects between firms of a given industry located in the same area.
The purpose was clearly to promote agglomeration externalities and clusters dynamics. This
policy corresponds to a quite radical shift in the objectives of French regional policy, from tra-
ditional spatial equity to taking more into account efficiency considerations in the geographic
distribution of economic activities. One of the motivations was to replicate the alleged suc-
cess of Italian industrial districts in the 1980’s: the idea was to enhance, through public
intervention, collaborations which developed “naturally” in Italy.
Around one hundred projects were submitted and around fifty of them received a subsidy
in 1999. An additional fifty were funded in 2000, when the agency in charge issued a new
tender. The tender was then transformed into a permanent one, and each year new or old
3Which are very similar to the French PAT.
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propositions (only a handful of them now) are getting approved and funded by an ad hoc
national commission.
The stated aim of the policy was to give a small monetary incentive (the average subsidy
is around 37,500 euros) to set off or reinforce clusters. Conditions to receive this subsidy were
not very restrictive at the beginning of the process. Conditions are now more demanding
(established collaborations, credibility of the proposed action, knowledge of direct competitors
etc.). Officially, the policy funds a project and not directly a group of firms. Very often, the
official candidate organizing the project is a local public authority, and private firms join once
the structure has secured the necessary funding. A wide range of actions can be funded: A
study of feasibility for the development of a common brand, the creation of a grouping of
employers or the implementation of collective actions in the field of exports for instance. The
geographical scale of a LPS is generally the de´partement or the employment area4.
The LPS can be seen as the first cluster policy in France. A new policy, called “Competi-
tiveness clusters” that started in 2005 is a much more ambitious and costly cluster policy than
the one analyzed here (note however that a quarter of LPS projects have been transformed
into competitiveness clusters).
2.2 The data and methodology
We use French annual business survey5 data, provided by the French ministry of Industry.
We have information at both the firm and plant levels. This is restricted to firms with more
than 20 employees and all the plants of those firms. Our data cover the period 1996-2004.
At the firm level, we have all the balance-sheet data (in particular, production, value-added,
employment, capital, exports, aggregate wages) and information about firm location, firm
industry classification and firm structure (e.g. number of plants).
At the plant level, data are less exhaustive; they contain plant location, plant industry
classification, plant number of employees and information about the firm the plant belongs
to.
We obtained from the public authority in charge of the LPS policy, the DIACT, the
list of LPS and the information about the subsidies obtained as well as the structure which
administers. We contacted individually during the year 2006 around 90 LPS, to ask them the
list of their adherents. Workable files were obtained for 56 of them, which represents 3,234
firms. We however lost information when we merged these firms with the annual business
surveys to obtain data on production and employment. Many of the LPS reported the name
and the address of firms, but not their national identification number. We consequently had
to find out most firms in the annual business surveys thanks to their name and their zip code
only. We merged successfully only 641 firms (the others are probably firms with less than 20
employees or with badly collected information), from 45 LPS created between 1999 and 2003.
From a geographic point of view, we dropped all firms located in Corsica and in overseas
de´partements. Consequently, our sample covers the 94 continental French de´partements and
341 employment areas. From a sectoral point of view, we only retained firms belonging to
manufacturing sectors6. In particular, food-proceeding firms had to be dropped.
4The de´partements are administrative areas. Employment areas are economic entities defined on the basis
of workers’ commuting. There are 94 de´partements and 341 employment areas in continental France
5Called in French “Enqueˆtes Annuelles d’Entreprises”.
6In the French 2-digit classification, we kept sectors 17 to 36, sector 23 excluded.
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More observations are dropped: the ones for which value-added, employment or capital
is missing, negative or null. We also dropped all the firms which changed geographical unit
or industrial sector during the period, in order to use the geographical and sectoral dummies
that control for spatial and industrial unobservable characteristics7. We deflated value-added
data by a branch price-index and capital data by a an investment price index valid for all
industrial sectors. In the end, the sample is an unbalanced panel involving 417 firms which
belong to a LPS. Eighty-eight 3-digit industrial sectors and thirty-nine LPS are represented.
For employment areas data, we use the “Atlas des zones d’emploi” published by the
INSEE, the French institute for national statistics, in 1998.
2.3 Which industries are targeted by LPS?
Some simple descriptive statistics on the industries targeted by the LPS policy are useful.
We distinguish the manufacturing industries which are not represented in the LPS (24 non-
treated industries), the industries represented by less than 10 LPS firms (49 industries) and
the industries represented in the LPS by at least 10 firms (14 industries). The average of
several indicators for these three categories are presented in table 1.
Table 1: Industry level summary statistics
Variables Non LPS-treated indus-
tries
Industries with less than 10
LPS-treated firms
Industries with at least 10
LPS-treated firms
Average level in 2004
Labour productivity 59.72 56.89 50.45
Capitalistic intensity 103.04 82.15 57.22
Export share 0.37 0.36 0.28
Evolution between 1996 and 2004 (in %)
Employees -10.68 -9.43 -1.04
Value added 19.30 22.60 28.96
Labour productivity 34.54 33.10 32.64
Exports 23.19 50.06 58.08
Note: Labour productivity=value added/employees, capitalistic intensity=capital
stock/employees, export share=export value/sales. Values are in thousands of real
euros.
In 2004, the average labour productivity is lower in LPS industries than in the rest of
manufacturing industries. This result is particularly clear for the industries where LPS are
the most important. LPS industries are also much more labour intensive than the others.
Between 1996 and 2004, the employment loss for the average French non-LPS manufactur-
ing industries is 10.68%. LPS intensive industries lost much less employment (1.04%). Their
value added also increased more (28.96% vs 19.30%), but not proportionally to employment,
so that labour productivity increased on average by 34.54% in non-LPS industries, and by
only 32.64% in the 14 main LPS industries. Finally, LPS firms belong to industries that
export less than the average but their exports grew faster over the period.
To summarize, LPS industries are on average much more labour intensive than the rest of
manufacturing; they destroyed less employment than other industries in the 1996-2004 period
7We also dropped outliers, dropping 1% extremes for the following variables: average work productivity,
capital intensity, yearly capital growth rate, yearly employment growth rate, yearly average work productivity
growth rate, yearly average capital intensity growth rate. We also had to drop the “Weapons and ammunitions”
industry, which is a clear outlier.
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but their productivity gains were also lower.
2.4 Who are LPS firms?
We now analyze the characteristics of firms that participated to one of the selected LPS.
Table ?? presents summary statistics about the LPS firms of our sample. They are larger
and less productive than non LPS firms. However, the standard deviation for all their char-
acteristics is lower than for other firms. This suggests that the policy targeted firms with
specific characteristics.
Table 2: Summary statistics about firms
LPS firms Non LPS firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Value added 2701 10357.31 29727.32 146599 6038.23 42534.43
Employees 2701 219.70 538.03 146599 123.79 651.70
Capital Stock 2701 14466.74 55573.65 146599 7623.53 107991.50
Labour productivity 2701 39.83 16.41 146599 41.24 19.22
Note: Value added, capital, capital intensity, labour productivity and exports are expressed in
thousands of real euros
To go further in this analysis, we estimate, with a logit model, the probability for a firm
to become a LPS-firm. We take into account average firm-level characteristics prior their
entrance in a LPS. We also control for characteristics of the employment areas where the
firms are located. The way we compute firm-level average characteristics is not trivial. Our
panel is unbalanced. Moreover, firms entered the LPS scheme in different years between 1999
and 2003. Hence, the number of years for which we can observe the firm characteristics prior
their entrance in a LPS is not the same for all firms. If firms’ characteristics are affected by
annual common shocks, the computation of pre-LPS average characteristics could therefore
be noisy; hence, we correct all individual observations for yearly trends. We then compute for
each firm its average characteristics for the years before its “entry” in a LPS. For non-LPS
firms and firms in LPS sustained in 2003, these average characteristics are computed with all
the available de-trended observations from 1996 to 2003. We keep in the end 335 LPS firms
in the sample.
The results are displayed in table 3. The index of TFP we use is obtained with an
estimate of a production function, following an OLS approach. In the appendix, we show
that our results are robust when we use a GMM estimation for TFP (see table 20). Column
(1) presents results from a simple logit, where we control for the size (number of employees)
of the firm, its TFP, the amount of subsidies (other than LPS) it receives and the number
of workers in other firms of the same industry-area. It appears that in this very simple
specification, LPS firms are bigger than the others and receive more public subsidies overall.
These two characteristics of LPS are very robust. One interpretation is that LPS firms are
important for local politicians because they are big employers and that they are good at
lobbying for public subsidies.
The inclusion of industry-fixed effects does not change these results (regression (2)) but
the inclusion of de´partements fixed effects (regression (3)) does: LPS are more productive
than the other firms of their de´partement. Given that the coefficient on TFP is close to zero
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Table 3: LPS determinants
Dependent Variable: lps status
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean (ln Employeesiszt) 0.187
a 0.176a 0.237a 0.243a
(0.069) (0.068) (0.071) (0.072)
Mean (TFPiszt) -0.087 0.037 0.416
b 0.360c
(0.186) (0.164) (0.179) (0.189)
Mean (ln Subsidiesiszt) 0.073
a 0.068a 0.053a 0.052a
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Mean [ln (Employeesszt − Employeesiszt + 1)] -0.023 -0.014 0.212b 0.169c
(0.022) (0.030) (0.094) (0.088)
ln Mean (Taxable net incomez1994) 4.424b
(1.868)
ln Mean (Taxable net income growth ratez1984−1994) -2.593a
(0.968)
ln Population densityz1994 -0.328
c
(0.191)
ln Industrial jobs sharez1994 1.771
a
(0.420)
ln Share of population with vocational trainingz1990 -2.723
c
(1.480)
Industry fixed effects no yes yes yes
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes
N 18196 18196 18196 18196
R2 0.014 0.053 0.19 0.215
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All regressions are clustered at the
emloyment area level. Necessarily, t ≤ lps year
and not significant when we do not control for de´partement fixed effects, this means that LPS
firms are located in less productive de´partements8
Note also that the number of employees in the other firms of the same industry-de´partement,
which is a proxy for potential localization economies, is close to zero and not significant in the
simple OLS regression. This is surprising since the LPS policy is supposed to be a cluster-
promotion policy. It may be partly due to the fact that LPS firms are bigger than the others,
which mechanically reduces, for a given size of the industry in the de´partement, the number of
employees in surrounding firms. But the coefficient is strongly positive and significant when
de´partements fixed effects are added. Hence, another non exclusive explanation would be
that the LPS policy targeted clusters which are relevant at a local level, but not at a national
level.
In regression (6), we include some characteristics of the employment areas where firms
are located. The results are robust to this inclusion. Moreover, these regressions show that,
relative to the average in the de´partement, LPS firms are located in areas which are less
dense, more dependent on industry, richer, and with less workers with vocational training.
Note however, their average taxable income growth was smaller over the 1984-1994 period.
We will use this regression and what it tells us about the observable characteristics of LPS
firms to construct our sample for the matching approach when we analyze the impact of LPS
status on firm performance.
8This is confirmed by the fact that LPS firm are located in de´partements which receive the “Prime
d’Ame´nagement du territoire” (PAT), one of the main instruments of regional policy in France and which
have a high share of subsidized employment: see table 21 in the Appendix).
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2.5 Empirical methodology: a difference-in-difference approach
The stated objective of the LPS policy is to improve firms’ competitiveness. To analyze
whether the LPS was successful in this respect we quantify the impact of the LPS policy
on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). We also analyze its impact on firm’s employment.
The approach we choose is based on the standard “difference-in-difference” method (DD) (see
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)).
yit is our dependent variable (firms’ TFP or employment). The relation we bring to data
is the following:
yit = γlpsi + θlps init + dt + it (1)
where lpsi is a dummy variable which identifies LPS firms which at some point benefit
from the LPS label. This dummy captures all time-invariant unobservable characteristics
specific to firms targeted by the LPS policy. lps init is a dummy which equals 1 for LPS
firms the year it receives the subsidy and thereafter. dt is a time trend, common to all firms.
If it is orthogonal to the regressors, θ is the DD estimator of the effect of LPS policy on
firm’s performance. It is indeed obtained by comparing the evolution of performance for a
LPS firm before and after its entry in the LPS, to the evolution of performance for a non-
LPS firm during the same period. Section 2.4 however showed that LPS firms had particular
characteristics, especially in terms of location and industries, which both determined their
probability of belonging to a LPS and their performance before. This suggests several sources
of bias in our estimates of γ and θ. If the fact of being in a LPS is also correlated to specific
shocks or to temporal trends (if it = ui + ηit and if E(ηit+1 − ηit) is different for LPS and
non-LPS firms), our estimation will suffer from a simultaneity bias. The best way to control
for both unobserved invariant characteristics and unobserved idiosyncratic shocks would be
to instrument the LPS variables. There is however no obvious set of natural instruments that
would be good predictors of entry into the LPS scheme, while being unrelated to the firm’s
performance. We will consequently address the invariant part of that endogeneity issue by
adding different sets of fixed effects. This amounts to assuming that the biggest part of the
problem mentioned is a correlation of LPS participation with ui rather than with ηit. We
combine this with a matching approach, which accounts for the fact that LPS firms are quite
specific in the observable characteristics and identifies a group of non treated firms with the
most similar set of such observables.
3 Results
3.1 LPS and Productivity
We first present our results on TFP. To estimate firm TFP, we regress firm value-added on
employment and capital and keep the residuals; the estimated elasticities for employment
and capital are respectively 0.85 and 0.15. In the appendix, we discuss the limitations of the
OLS approach to TFP estimation and perform robustness checks where we estimate TFP
with GMM. Results are very similar. In unreported investigations, we also tested our results
using a Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach for the estimation of firms’ TFP. Again, results
(available upon request) are qualitatively robust.
8
−
.
15
0
.
15
D
iff
er
en
ce
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
no
n 
LP
S 
fir
m
s
N
o 
co
nt
ro
l
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of years before/after the public support to the LPS
−
.
15
0
.
15
D
iff
er
en
ce
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
no
n 
LP
S 
fir
m
s
D
ep
. c
on
tro
l
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of years before/after the public support to the LPS
(a) (b)
−
.
15
0
.
15
D
iff
er
en
ce
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
no
n 
LP
S 
fir
m
s
D
ep
. c
on
tro
l &
 s
ec
t. 
co
nt
ro
l
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of years before/after the public support to the LPS
−
.
15
0
.
15
D
iff
er
en
ce
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
no
n 
LP
S 
fir
m
s
Fi
rm
 c
on
tro
l
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of years before/after the public support to the LPS
(c) (d)
Figure 1: LPS firms and evolution of OLS TFP
3.1.1 A graphical exploration
We start with a graphical analysis of the evolution of productivity differential between LPS
and non-LPS firms. We estimate the following four regressions:
tfpit =
5∑
j=−2
αj lps inijt + dt + it (2)
tfpit = fez +
5∑
j=−2
αj lps inijt + dt + it (3)
tfpit = fez + fes +
5∑
j=−2
αj lps inijt + dt + it (4)
tfpit = fei +
5∑
j=−2
αj lps inijt + dt + it (5)
where lps inijt equals 1 if j years separate time t from the moment when firm i will
become (resp. has become) a LPS firm. The first regression simply estimates the difference
of productivity between LPS and non-LPS firms according to the number of years which
separate the LPS firm from the reception of the subsidy. We then add fixed effects with
increasing levels of detail: region z, then region z/sector s, and finally firm-level i. Only the
last regression actually yields a difference-in-difference estimator of the LPS effect. The four
sets of results are presented in panels (a) to (d) of figure 1.
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We first perform the estimation on the whole sample. The grey zone on each panel corre-
sponds to the 5% confidence interval. According to the first estimation, without any control
in panel (a), LPS firms are not significantly different from the others two years before their
entry in a LPS, but a negative and significant productivity gap grows over time between both
types of firms. With de´partements controls in panel (b), LPS firms appear more productive
than the others before their entry in a LPS; this suggests that LPS firms are located in less
productive de´partements. Nevertheless, LPS firms still seem to be on a declining path in
terms of productivity, even though the differential with non-LPS firms for a given year is
never significant at the 5% level. Those results clearly show that LPS firms are on a different
temporal trend than the others. When firm fixed effects are controlled for in panel (d), the
declining path seems to be stopped during two years after the entry in the LPS; but then,
the decline with respect to other firms starts again.
Figure 2 presents the same results for single-plant firms. Indeed, the LPS policy is sup-
posed to help firms better coordinate their strategies with firms nearby and more generally to
enable firms to benefit more from the network of firms in the region. Multi-plant firms, which
are also typically bigger, may be less dependent on their local environment and therefore
respond less to the LPS policy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, we do not have the
information on the LPS status at the plant level. Hence, for multi-plant firms, the effect of
the policy may be both weaker and mis-measured. Hence, we analyze the case of single plant
firms (304 LPS firms) which do not suffer from those problems. Comments are roughly the
same, except that with firm fixed effects, the declining path is not only stopped but reversed
into a rising pattern; two years after the entry in a LPS, single plant firms are 3.4% more
productive than the others (significant at 10%). But it is a very short run effect.
We now turn to proper difference-in-difference econometric analysis to investigate the
robustness of those first results more systematically. In table 4, the simple OLS regression
shows that the LPS firms are not “structurally” different from the others (with a negative
but insignificant coefficient on the LPS dummy). However, they experience a negative and
very significant productivity drop once they are in a LPS. When we introduce industry fixed
effects, the coefficient of the variable “Being in a LPS” increases from -0.071 to -0.049, which
suggests that LPS firms belong to declining industries. Interestingly, once de´partements fixed
effects are taken into account (regression (3)), the coefficient on “LPS firms” becomes positive
and significant; again this means that LPS firms are located in less productive de´partements.
Nevertheless, “Being in a LPS” still has a negative and significant coefficient which persists
when we introduce firm fixed effects in regression (6), though closer to zero. There are several
possible interpretations of this rather pessimistic result on the LPS policy. One is that the
LPS policy causes this negative effect. It is possible that the firms that receive the LPS label
become more receptive to public pressure to postpone workers layouts. In this interpretation,
firms may choose to forego labor saving productivity improvements. In section 3.2, we present
results on employment which are consistent with this interpretation. Another interpretation
- not exclusive of the first one - is that firms that enter a LPS do it when they face difficulties:
ηit and lps init are certainly correlated and there would consequently be a simultaneity bias in
the estimation of the causal impact of the policy on firms’ TFP. The graphical analysis tends
to corroborate that idea since even with firm and year fixed effects, LPS firms still appear
different from the others before the implementation of the policy; it should not be the case
in the absence of specific temporal trends. We try to address this issue in subsection 3.1.2.
Results on single plant firms are presented in table 5. They confirm our main conclusions but
some subtle differences emerge: LPS single-plant firms tend to be located in less productive
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Figure 2: LPS single-plant firms and evolution of OLS TFP
de´partements and once they enter the LPS policy, their productivity stagnates. Overall,
however, the LPS policy appears less negative or even slightly positive for the single plant
firms, as we saw with the graphical analysis. But it is a very short effect and with the GMM
TFP index, this positive effect cannot be detected.
Table 4: LPS and OLS TFP
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.003 -0.000 0.039b 0.031b
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Being in a LPS -0.071a -0.049a -0.060a -0.044a -0.021c
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 149300 149300 149300 149300 149300
R2 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.24 0.03
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
3.1.2 LPS and temporal endogeneity
We saw that the entry into a LPS coincides with a decline in productivity and that this
decline could be explained by sectoral and geographical determinants. The existence of such
11
Table 5: LPS and OLS TFP-Single plant firms
Dependent Variable: ln TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.028 -0.031c 0.024 0.007
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Being in a LPS -0.045b -0.024 -0.031c -0.017 -0.008
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 104175 104175 104175 104175 104175
R2 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.24 0.03
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
a correlation biases the estimation of the “causal” impact of the policy.
We resort to two different strategies:
• we introduce de´partement-time and industry-time fixed effects in order to purge the
estimation from all the geographic and sectoral shocks, common to all firms over the
period.
• we saw in subsection 2.4 that there was a clear selection of LPS firms on observable
characteristics. If those characteristics are also correlated with the evolution of firms’
TFP, we can improve the estimation of LPS policy impact by using a matching strategy.
Using the last regression of table 3 in subsection 2.4, we compute the probability for
all firms to belong to a LPS. Note that in this regression, all the firms in industries or
de´partements which are not represented in the LPS have already been eliminated . To
comply more confidently to the common support condition of the matching approach,
we drop from the sample those firms which have a probability above the 99th percentile
for non-LPS firms and below the 5th percentile of LPS ones. 238 LPS firms remain in
the sample, from which 178 are single plant firms.
In table 6, we see that for the whole sample, the introduction of de´partement-time fixed ef-
fects does not affect the results with respect to a simple de´partements fixed effects estimation.
On the contrary, the observed negative drop is larger with industry-time fixed effects than
with industry fixed effects. This confirms that LPS firms operate in declining sectors. The
LPS policy would have a static redistributive dimension (towards structurally less productive
de´partements) and a more dynamic one (towards declining sectors). For single plant firms
(table 7), as soon as industry-time fixed effects are controlled for, the drop after the entry
in the LPS is not significant any more. Matching approach on both samples tends to reduce
or cancel that drop too (tables 8 and 9). Our main results remain nevertheless unchanged:
the LPS policy does not succeed in reversing the negative trend observed with simple OLS
estimation.
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Table 6: LPS and OLS TFP
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.003 -0.004 0.039a 0.027a 0.030a
(0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Being in a LPS -0.071a -0.043a -0.060a -0.037a -0.035b
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Year fixed effects yes n.a n.a n.a n.a
Industry-time fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement-time fixed effects no no yes no no
De´partement fixed effects no no no yes no
Industry-De´partement-time fixed effects no no no no yes
N 149300 149300 149300 149300 149300
R2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 7: LPS and OLS TFP-Single plant firms
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.028 -0.034a 0.021 0.004 -0.006
(0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Being in a LPS -0.045b -0.019 -0.026 -0.011 0.007
(0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Year fixed effects yes n.a n.a n.a n.a
Industry-time fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement-time fixed effects no no yes no no
De´partement fixed effects no no no yes no
Industry-De´partement-time fixed effects no no no no yes
N 104175 104175 104175 104175 104175
R2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 8: LPS and OLS TFP-Matching
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.017 -0.031c 0.008 -0.003
(0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Being in a LPS -0.063a -0.036b -0.041b -0.028c -0.002
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 57337 57337 57337 57337 57337
R2 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.03
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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Table 9: LPS and OLS TFP-Single plant firms, matching
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.031 -0.055a -0.005 -0.023
(0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Being in a LPS -0.040b -0.008 -0.020 -0.003 0.014
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 40506 40506 40506 40506 40506
R2 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.03
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
3.1.3 Further issues
A possible defense of the LPS policy is that the absence of a measurable effect comes from
the small size of the monetary subsidy involved. In other words, the policy is good but should
receive more funds. To test this idea, we use for all single-plant firms9 involved in a LPS the
information on the amount of the subsidy perceived by the LPS they belong to. The average
subsidy for this group is 45,000 euros. In table 10, the significantly negative coefficient on the
amount of the subsidy suggests that the strongest monetary support goes to weaker firms.
This negative coefficient cannot be interpreted in causal terms since the subsidy variable has
no impact once individual fixed-effect are introduced.
Table 10: LPS, OLS TFP and Subsidy
Dependent Variable: ln TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.025 -0.032c 0.027 0.008
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Being in a LPS 0.498c 0.680a 0.422 0.652a 0.015
(0.265) (0.243) (0.265) (0.241) (0.196)
Being in a LPS×ln(Subsidy+1) -0.150b -0.192a -0.124c -0.182a -0.007
(0.071) (0.065) (0.071) (0.064) (0.052)
N 103860 103860 103860 103860 103860
R2 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.24 0.03
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individ-
ual autocorrelation. Subsidy is in thousands real euros. average subsidy≈45, median
subsidy≈38.
9Since we do not know which plant obtained the subsidy, we concentrate on single-plant firms. These
are also the firms for which a positive effect, if it exists, should be best measured. We have the necessary
information for 252 firms.
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We also tested the policy could have a different impact on firms of different size, on
firms belonging to LPS of different size on firms belonging to LPS with different governance
structure: no significant heterogeneity could be detected.
We also tested whether the LPS policy had an effect on the size of the clusters they
targeted. Table 11 shows that LPS firms belong to pre-existing clusters: the number of
employees from the same industry in the other firms of the de´partement (the left hand side
variable in the regressions of this table) is much higher for LPS firms once de´partement fixed
effects have been introduced. However, there is no indication that the cluster policy was
attractive to other firms of the same sector. If anything, the years the LPS are implemented
are years during which the size of the cluster to which these firms belong decreases. Since
Martin, Mayer, and Mayneris (2008) have shown that the size of clusters has a positive impact
on French firms productivity, this result may partly explain why we do not find productivity
gains for LPS firms.
Table 11: LPS and localization economies
Dependent Variable:
ln (Employees, same industry-area, other firms)iszt
Model : (1) (2) (3)
LPS firm 0.165c 0.531a 0.438a
(0.096) (0.107) (0.057)
Being in a LPS -0.173b -0.135c -0.118c
(0.075) (0.078) (0.070)
Year fixed effects yes n.a n.a
De´partement fixed effects no yes yes
Industry-year fixed effects no no yes
Observations 100937 100937 100937
R2 0.00 0.00 0.33
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm-level in regression (1), at the industry-time level in
regressions (2) and (3).
3.2 LPS and firms’ labour demand
Up to now, the LPS policy, in spite of the official discourse presenting it as a clear break with
policies in favor of regions and industries in difficulty, appears clearly as a defensive policy. If
political economy factors are at the origin of the gap between the stated objectives and what
we measure, we may be missing all the action when looking at the effect of the policy on
productivity. The most important objective for national and local policy makers involved in
the policy may in fact be employment of these firms. Preserving jobs rather than increasing
productivity may have been the real objective. This is what Criscuolo, Matin, Overman, and
Van Reenen (2007) conclude from the study of Regional Selective Assistance in the UK.
To look at this, we adopt the same strategy as for productivity and start with graphical
analysis. It appears on figures 3 and 4 that LPS firms are “structurally” bigger than the
others. Once individual fixed effects have been taken into account, LPS firms still appear
bigger than the others. But they do before and after their entry in a LPS, without any clear
change in the pattern of their size, so that it is difficult to identify a specific role of the policy.
We then concentrate on the econometric analysis. We regress firms’ current employment
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Figure 3: LPS firms and evolution of employment
on the two variables “LPS firm” and “Being in a LPS”. We develop in appendix a more
structural approach, which yields similar results.
LPS firms are significantly bigger employers than the others, something we know from
subsection 2.4. Interestingly, tables 12 and 13 for all firms and single plant firms respectively,
show that LPS firms perform better in terms of employment once they are in the LPS. This is
so once we control for firm fixed effects. The effect on employment is however quite modest,
not specific to the period post-subsidy as suggested by the graphical analysis, and disappears
completely with the matching estimations (tables 14 and 15).
Table 12: LPS and firms’ labour demand
Dependent Variable: ln Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm 0.303a 0.253a 0.309a 0.261a
(0.067) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063)
Being in a LPS 0.033 0.050 0.037 0.046 0.031b
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.015)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 149300 149300 149300 149300 149300
R2 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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Figure 4: LPS single-plant firms and evolution of employment
Table 13: LPS and single plant firms’ labour demand
Dependent Variable: ln Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm 0.136b 0.097b 0.106b 0.074
(0.053) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049)
Being in a LPS 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.020 0.028c
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.016)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 104175 104175 104175 104175 104175
R2 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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Table 14: LPS and firms’ labour demand-Matching estimations
Dependent Variable: ln Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm 0.018 0.031 0.120c 0.158b
(0.067) (0.065) (0.064) (0.062)
Being in a LPS 0.057 0.063 0.073c 0.056 0.005
(0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.017)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 57337 57337 57337 57337 57337
R2 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.06
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 15: LPS and single plant firms’ labour demand-Matching estimations
Dependent Variable: ln Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.005 -0.006 0.053 0.067
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055)
Being in a LPS 0.009 0.023 0.017 0.022 -0.009
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.019)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 40506 40506 40506 40506 40506
R2 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.06
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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4 Robustness checks
We have conducted so far our analysis at the firm level. Two issues arise about this method-
ological choice:
1. Proponents of cluster policies often claim that these policies do not only affect the firms
directly targeted but the whole sector in the region. In the presence of this type of
externality, the estimation of the LPS policy at the firm level may underestimate its
true economic impact.
2. There is possible measurement error in our sample of LPS firms: in our survey, it is
possible that some LPS firms are identified as control firms. The reason is that we have
to rely on partially incomplete information provided by managers in response to our
survey.
To address both issues, we now present our analysis at the industry-de´partement level
rather than at the firm level. This allows to capture possible local spillover effects. This
also reduces the measurement error since the geographical scale of the LPS policy is the
de´partement.
4.1 LPS and industry-de´partements’ productivity and employment
We define the total factors productivity in industry s and de´partement z at time t as a
weighted sum of firms’ TFP:
TFPszt =
∑[(empiszt
empszt
)
× TFPiszt
]
(6)
where empiszt is the number of employees of firm i from industry s, in de´partement z at
time t and empszt is the number of employees from industry s, in de´partement z at time t.
We define an industry-de´partement cell as being affected by the LPS policy when at least
one firm from industry s and de´partement z has been involved in LPS over the period.
Conclusions remain very similar to those obtained at firm-level except that when industry-
de´partement fixed effects are included, the negative productivity differential consecutive to
the LPS treatment is not significant anymore10. In unreported regressions, we use single-plant
firms only to construct the indices of industry-de´partement level productivity; all coefficients
are insignificant, either with OLS index or GMM index.
From the point of view of employment growth, results are also very similar: the number
of employees in LPS industry-de´partement is structurally higher than the average and its
growth is significantly higher when industry-de´partement fixed effects are included. Once
again, the positive employment differential after LPS treatment is not significant when we
consider single-plant firms only.
We test heterogeneity in industry-de´partement performance by distinguishing, as in sec-
tion 2, “core” LPS industries (represented by at least 10 firms) and the others. This did not
yield conclusive results.
To sum up, the analysis at a more aggregated level is consistent with the analysis at the
firm level. This suggests that spillovers effects and measurement errors are not crucial.
10When using GMM index, results at firm level and industry-de´partement level are also very similar, even
with industry-de´partement fixed effects
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Table 16: LPS and OLS TFP-Industry/De´partement analysis
Dependent Variable: TFPszt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS industry-de´partement 0.017 0.024 0.029c 0.031b
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Being in a LPS -0.039a -0.032a -0.036a -0.029b -0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Industry-de´partement fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 34750 34750 34750 34750 34750
R2 0.041 0.050 0.045 0.245 0.107
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account autocorrelation
at the industry-de´partement level.
Table 17: LPS and number of employees-Industry/De´partement analysis
Dependent Variable: Employeesszt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS industry-de´partement 1.076a 0.775a 1.099a 0.733a
(0.095) (0.089) (0.082) (0.075)
Being in a LPS -0.037 -0.024 -0.023 -0.004 0.061c
(0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.041) (0.035)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Industry-de´partement fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 34750 34750 34750 34750 34750
R2 0.033 0.019 0.038 0.236 0.004
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account autocorrelation
at the industry-de´partement level.
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4.2 LPS and firms’ survival
In this subsection, we test the hypothesis that the LPS policy may have affected the proba-
bility of exit of firms. Indeed, in our political economy interpretation, this policy may have
had a negative effect on productivity but may have helped firms to survive and therefore to
maintain employment. We cannot test this hypothesis at the firm level because most of LPS
managers gave us only the list of LPS firms still in activity in 2006. Hence, we cannot identify
LPS firms which disappeared before our survey.
This is why we conduct the analysis at a more aggregate level. For each industry-
de´partement, we compute the share of firms present in the sample in 1996 which are still
alive in 2004, so that we have one observation per industry-de´partement.
Table 18: LPS and firms’ survival-Industry/De´partement analysis
Dependent Variable: Share of surviving firms 1996-2004
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS industry-departement 0.063a 0.057a 0.038c 0.047b 0.030
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Mean OLS Tfpsz1996 0.104
a 0.111a 0.154a 0.166a
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028)
ln (Average firms’ sizesz1996) 0.019a 0.020b 0.032a 0.032a
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Industry fixed effects no no yes no yes
De´partement fixed effects no no no yes yes
Observations 3944 3944 3944 3944 3944
R2 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.022 0.092
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
Table 19: LPS and single plant firms’ survival-Industry/De´partement analysis
Dependent Variable: Share of surviving firms 1996-2004
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS industry-departement 0.086a 0.086a 0.061b 0.068a 0.045c
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Mean OLS Tfp sz1996 0.089a 0.098a 0.144a 0.148a
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028)
ln (Average firms’ sizesz1996) 0.038a 0.029b 0.033a 0.023c
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Industry fixed effects no no yes no yes
De´partement fixed effects no no no yes yes
Observations 3308 3308 3308 3308 3308
R2) 0.002 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.070
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
The first regression shows that industry-de´partements targeted by the LPS policy are
characterized by a higher survival rate between 1996 and 2004. We then control for the level
of productivity and the average size of firms in the industry-de´partement, which both affect
positively the share of surviving firms between 1996 and 2004. It is well known that bigger
and more productive firms are less likely to die (see for example Alvarez and Go¨rg (2007)).
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When controlling for industry and de´partement fixed effects separately, the LPS policy ap-
pears associated with a higher survival rate; when both types of fixed effects are added, the
coefficient on LPS policy is positive but not significant. We ran the same regressions for
single-plant firms only and the coefficient on LPS industry-de´partement remains positive and
significant even with sectoral and geographic fixed effects.
These results suggest that the LPS policy is associated with higher survival rates of firms.
Even if we cannot interpret these regressions as causal, they are again consistent with our
political economy interpretation of the policy: targeted industry-de´partements were in decline
in productivity terms but maintained employment both because employment increased at the
firm level and because less firms disappeared. Contrary to the official statements, the objective
and may be the impact of the LPS policy was employment and not productivity.
5 Conclusion
Our results on the first cluster policy implemented in France are not very positive. First, the
policy targeted firms in regions and sectors that were experiencing difficult times in terms
of productivity and therefore competitiveness. This was not its official objective and we can
interpret the gap between the stated and revealed objectives results in political economy
terms. The administration in charge of the policy, the DIACT, formerly the DATAR, was
created to promote territorial equity and to help lagging regions. It appears that it was
not able or willing to change in practice and our results point to bureaucratic continuity.
Another possible interpretation of the gap between stated and revealed objectives is that the
policy was captured by firms. Second, the policy did not succeed in reversing the relative
decline in productivity for the targeted firms. We can only detect a very weak and transitory
positive effect for single-plant firms. Third, the policy had a positive, even though modest
and transitory, effect on the employment of firms involved in the LPS policy. This result is
consistent with a political economy interpretation of our results: the revealed objective of
the policy was to protect the employment of big firms (LPS firms are larger than average) in
declining regions and sectors. Can we say good things about this policy? One could argue
that this policy may have had no effect on firm level productivity but at least was not very
costly. This low price tag does not apply to a more recent and ambitious cluster policy
implemented in France, called competitiveness clusters, which cost 1,5 billion euros.
To our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze empirically, with firm level data, the
impact of a cluster policy. It points to the apparent failure of the LPS policy to improve the
performance of targeted firms through better cooperation and to increase the attractiveness of
existing clusters. Obviously, our results cannot be generalized to other cluster policies which
may have performed better. However, we interpret it as a cautionary tale for policy makers
intending to commit large amounts of public money to such policies.
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APPENDIX
Table 20: LPS determinants-GMM TFP
Dependent Variable: lps status
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean (ln Employeesiszt) 0.175
b 0.176b 0.272a 0.273a
(0.071) (0.070) (0.074) (0.078)
Mean (GMM TFPiszt) -0.133 0.004 0.362
b 0.312c
(0.176) (0.153) (0.168) (0.182)
Mean (ln Subsidiesiszt) 0.073
a 0.067a 0.053a 0.052a
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Mean [ln (Employeesszt − Employeesiszt + 1)] -0.022 -0.014 0.212b 0.169c
(0.023) (0.030) (0.094) (0.088)
ln Mean (Taxable net incomez1994) 4.447b
(1.869)
ln Population densityz1994 -0.328
c
(0.191)
ln Industrial jobs sharez1994 1.775
a
(0.420)
ln Number of people with a CAP or a BEPz1990 -2.718
c
(1.478)
ln Mean (Taxable net income growth ratez1984−1994) -2.606a
(0.967)
Industry fixed effects no yes yes yes
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes
N 18196 18196 18196 18196
R2 0.014 0.053 0.19 0.215
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All regressions are clustered at the
emloyment area level. Necessarily, t ≤ lps year
Table 21: LPS and regional policies
LPS firm PAT in the Share of subsidized emp.
de´p.2000−2006 in the de´p.2006
LPS firm 1
PAT in the de´p.2000−2006 0.0436a 1
Share of subsidized employment in the de´p.2006 0.0255
a 0.5215a 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
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Table 22: Summary statistics about single plant firms
LPS firms Non LPS firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Value added 1837 3430.65 7931.83 102338 2830.81 7149.24
Employees 1837 86.90 185.10 102338 68.21 131.19
Capital Stock 1837 5839.06 33721.62 102338 3257.03 16707.36
Labour productivity 1837 38.18 15.46 102338 39.88 18.34
Note: Value added, capital, capital intensity, labour productivity and exports are expressed in
thousands of real euros
The estimation of TFP
To calculate firms’ TFP, we estimate a production function. We use a Cobb-Douglas
framework and we suppose that the value-added of firm i at time t, Yit, is:
Yit = AitKαitL
β
it (7)
where Kit and Lit are respectively the capital and the employees of the firm.
After a log-transformation, the model we will estimate is:
yit = αkit + βlit + it (8)
The estimation of such a production function is not trivial. Indeed, some unobserved
characteristics can both affect the amount of inputs and the level of output. If the entrepreneur
is less risk-averse than the others, he might tend to adopt a particular labor-capital mix,
he might have different innovation strategies and also might tend to seek less risky (and
potentially less lucrative) markets. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur faces a positive
productivity shock, he might produce more and hire more people in the same time. Here
again, the estimates of inputs-elasticities may be spurious.
An important literature has developed about the estimation of production functions. We
built on Griliches and Mairesse (1995), Olley and Pakes (1996) and Petrin, Poi, and Levinsohn
(2004) to calculate three estimates of inputs elasticities. For the GMM estimation, we first-
difference all the variables and we instrument inputs by their level at time t − 2. It yields
reasonable coefficients, with slightly increasing returns to scale (0.86 for labour and 0.21 for
capital). The Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) method, on the contrary, exhibits a decreasing returns
to scale production function, with rather credible coefficients (0.70 for labour and 0.15 for
capital). With the Olley-Pakes approach, we obtain abnormally low coefficient on capital
(0.76 for labour and 0.04 for capital).
We retain consequently the GMM. We calculate firms’ TFP as the residuals of value
added, once labour and capital have been taken into account and we use that TFP index as a
dependent variable to measure the impact of the LPS policy on firms’ productivity. Results
are very similar to those obtained with a simple OLS TFP index.
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Table 23: LPS and GMM TFP
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.035c -0.024 0.008 0.008
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Being in a LPS -0.077a -0.056a -0.066a -0.051a -0.025b
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 149300 149300 149300 149300 149300
R2 0.02 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 24: LPS and GMM TFP-Single plant firms
Dependent Variable: ln TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.045b -0.041b 0.011 -0.000
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Being in a LPS -0.051a -0.030 -0.038b -0.023 -0.012
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 104175 104175 104175 104175 104175
R2 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 25: LPS and GMM TFP
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.035c -0.028b 0.009 0.004 0.001
(0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Being in a LPS -0.077a -0.050a -0.067a -0.045a -0.044a
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Year fixed effects yes n.a n.a n.a n.a
Industry-time fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement-time fixed effects no no yes no no
De´partement fixed effects no no no yes no
Industry-De´partement-time fixed effects no no no no yes
N 149300 149300 149300 149300 149300
R2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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Table 26: LPS and GMM TFP-Single plant firms
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.045b -0.044a 0.008 -0.003 -0.015
(0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Being in a LPS -0.051a -0.025 -0.033b -0.018 0.001
(0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
Year fixed effects yes n.a n.a n.a n.a
Industry-time fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement-time fixed effects no no yes no no
De´partement fixed effects no no no yes no
Industry-De´partement-time fixed effects no no no no yes
N 104175 104175 104175 104175 104175
R2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 27: LPS and GMM TFP-Matching
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.017 -0.033c -0.002 -0.016
(0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
Being in a LPS -0.072a -0.046a -0.052a -0.037b -0.003
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 57337 57337 57337 57337 57337
R2 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 28: LPS and GMM TFP-Single plant firms, matching
Dependent Variable: TFP
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.031 -0.055a -0.010 -0.031
(0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Being in a LPS -0.045b -0.014 -0.027 -0.010 0.014
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 40506 40506 40506 40506 40506
R2 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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The estimation of labour demand
Firm-level labour demand functions are usually estimated in the literature by using a
dynamic model. Following Girma, Go¨rg, Strobl, and Walsh (2007), we estimate the following
log-linearized empirical model:
lit = αlit−1 + βyit + βwit + it (9)
where lit is labour demand, yit is value added and wit is the average wage of firm i at
time t. We consider that firms are price-taker for wages, which seems to be a reasonable
assumption given the low degree of variability of average wage across firms (in logarithm,
mean(average wage)=3.06 and sd(average wage)=0.2811. For symmetric reasons to those
mentioned about the estimation of production functions, and for technical aspects of the
estimation of dynamic models, lit−1 and yit are endogenous. Here again, we consequently use
a GMM approach on first-differenced variables instrumented by their level at time t− 2. All
the coefficients have the expected sign (the current number of employees in a firm is positively
affected by past level of employment and by current level of activity and negatively affected
by current average wage) and the results are coherent with the literature.
We calculate the residuals of that regression and we use them to assess the impact of the
LPS policy on firms’ employment, once “core” determinants of employment have been taken
into account.
Table 29: Labour demand
Dependent Variable: ln Employeesit
Model : (1)
ln Employeesit−1 0.555b
(0.016)
ln Value addedit 0.187
b
(0.027)
ln average wageit -0.406
b
(0.03)
N 91547
Centered R2 0.06
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.88
Note: Standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
11Treating average wage as endogenous yields a positive and significant coefficient, which seems rather
improbable.
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Table 30: LPS and firms’ residual labour demand
Dependent Variable: ln Res Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm 0.065a 0.051a 0.070a 0.056a
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Being in a LPS 0.002 0.013 0.009 0.015 0.011b
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 116134 116134 116134 116134 116134
R2 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.02
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 31: LPS and single plant firms’ residual labour demand
Dependent Variable: ln Res Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Being in a LPS -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.007 0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 80766 80766 80766 80766 80766
R2 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.03
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 32: LPS and firms’ residual labour demand-Matching
Dependent Variable: ln Res Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.000 -0.003 0.025 0.031c
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Being in a LPS 0.003 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 45503 45503 45503 45503 45503
R2 0.01 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.02
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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Table 33: LPS and single plant firms’ residual labour demand-Matching
Dependent Variable: ln Res Employeesit
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS firm -0.002 -0.011 0.012 0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Being in a LPS -0.016 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes no
De´partement fixed effects no no yes yes no
Individual fixed effects no no no no yes
N 32019 32019 32019 32019 32019
R2 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.03
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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